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Abstract
There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that ambiguity (i.e., parameter risk) impacts pricing decisions by actuaries and underwriters and their
desire to provide coverage. Stone proposed a safety first model of choice that
provides a possible explanation for this behavior. This paper analyzes Stone's
proposed stability and survival constraints and compares the results with those
predicted by expected utility theory. The analysis is motivated by insurers' increaSing reluctance to provide coverage for certain specific risks such as earthquake damage insurance where the probability of loss is ambiguous. We show
that such behavior is consistent with safety first but is difficult to explain using
an expected utility approach.
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Introduction

Stone (l973a, 1973b) put forward a behavioral theory of insurance
capacity in the spirit of a chance constrained/safety first model of
choice that still stands as a possible explanation for crises of availability in insurance markets. Stone proposes that constraints of stability
and survival are used by insurance companies for acceptance or rejection of risks, where stability means regularity in corporate profits over
time, and survival refers to the specification of a maximum probability
that aggregate losses exceed surplus.
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a more formal analysis of
these constraints and to compare the results to the predictions of expected utility theory. Short-run supply functions are derived that determine the lowest price that a firm will charge to protect a certain number
of risks against a particular event or, equivalently, how many risks the
firm will insure at a given price. The actual price that is observed will
reflect the demand for insurance. Our focus is on the first steps that
firms are likely to take before entering the marketplace.
In his analysis of insurer behavior Stone suggests that "second degree uncertainty" (also termed ambiguity) influences decisions on price
as well as whether a firm will want to offer coverage. Stone does not
specify how ambiguity would be incorporated in his model of choice,
however. In the last few years a literature on ambiguity has arisen
that addresses the issue of economic behavior when there is uncertainty over the parameters of probability distributions (Kunreuther,
1989; Kunreuther, Hogarth, and Meszaros 1993).
Of interest to us is the impact of ambiguity on the premium charged
by the firm and its desire to prm'ide coverage. Our analysis is motivated
by insurers' recent difficulties in providing coverage for specific risks
where the probability of a loss is ambiguous. For example, today insurers are reluctant to provide coverage to homeowners against earthquakes because of a concern that the losses from a catastrophic disaster
could create capacity problems and possibly cause insolvency. Hence,
the indllstry has argued for some type of federal earthquake insurance
program just as they did for flood coverage in the 1960s; for more on
this, see the Insurance Services Office (1994). As we shall demonstrate,
this lack of interest by private firms in providing protection is consistent with a safety first model of firm behavior, but is difficult to explain
using an expected utility approach.
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2 Safety First and Utility Theory
Suppose that an insurer is interested in offering one-period coverage for a group of n mutually independent risks. At the end of the
period, each risk is assumed to have a probability e of causing a loss of
fixed amount fl. (At this point e is assumed to be a known constant. I
In Section 3, however, we will consider the case where e is a random
variable.) The insurer's current surplus on hand, w, is assumed to be
known with certainty. In addition, the insurer is assumed to be risk
averse with a known continuous concave utility function.
Under traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern 2 expected utility pricing, the premium is set so the insurer is indifferent between taking the
risk or not. The pricing relation is given by
u(W) = E[uCw + nIT

-

X)]

(1)

where:
u(·)
IT

X

The insurer's utility function;
The insurance premium per risk; and
Aggregate losses for the n risks
Kxfl

where K is the actual number of losses.
Under Stone's model of safety first behavior, the premium is determined by constraints of stability and solvency. Expenses are ignored in
the analysis that follows. Stability requires a probability less than PI
that the loss ratio exceeds a certain target level r*. Specifically, if there
are n risks, the premium ITs required to satisfy the stability constraint
is given by
Kfl
(2)
Pr[-- > r*] < PI,
nITs

'Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by uppercase English or
Greek letters.
2Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed expected utility theory for use
when there is a process of decision making under uncertainty. Expected utility theory
has been used by actuaries since the 1960s; see, for example, Borch (1968). There are
many problems associated with expected utility theory, however, such as (i) the lack
of a unique utility function, (ii) the utility function, even if unique, may be unknown,
and (iii) the utility function may be concave in some areas and convex in other areas.
See, for example, Ramsay (1993, Section 3.2) for more on the problems associated with
expected utility theory.
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where K is the actual number of losses. Clearly K is binomially distributed with parameters nand e, i.e.,

(3)
The survival constraint relates aggregate losses for the risk in question to the current surplus plus premiums written. It requires that the
probability of insolvency be less than P2. The premium ITr required to
satisfy the survival constraint is given by:
Pr[Kf> w + nIT,-] < P2.

(4)

Because the safety first constraints do not always provide a definitive premium, it is necessary to include a profit criterion as part of a
pricing model. Stone indicates that insurers often specify a fixed profit
margin in making their pricing decisions. Let m represent the profit
margin for a given risk. If one uses the expected value of losses as a
reference point, then the profit criterion for any given risk would yield
premium ITe (ignoring expenses) given by:
ITe =

eP(l + m).

Of course, the premium may be higher than that implied by the profit
criterion because of the stability and solvency constraints.
The expected profit criterion coupled with the safety first constraints
form a supply function for insurance that relates required premiums to
the number of poliCies written. Figure 1 illustrates the prices required
under the safety first constraints. Here e = 0.10, m = 0.10,& = 1, and
r* = l.0, and the survival constraint is graphed for w = 0, 5, and 10.
The safety first probabilities are, respectively, Pi = 0.05, P2 = 0.0000l.
It is evident from Figure 1 that the magnitude of w is only important for
smaller values of n. For very small values of n (and for w greater than
zero) premiums will be determined by the stability constraint because
a relatively high premium is needed for the loss ratio to be less than
one with the required probability.
Figure 2 shows the supply function that results from the safety first
constraints with w = 10 that are graphed in Figure l. This supply
function is generated from three curves shown in Figure 1: (i) Stability,
(ii) Survival (w = 10), and (iii) Profit Objective. SpeCifically, the supply
function is determined as follows: For each value of n,
IT =

max {Stability, Survival, Profit Objective}.
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Figure 1
Premiums Under Safety First Constraints
With 8 = 0.10 and m = 0.10
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For the supply function n, the number of risks insured, is the quantity
supplied, and IT is the price per unit risk.
The supply function can be compared with that implied when the insurer sets premiums on the basis of expected utility. For an exponential
utility function
(5)

equation (1) implies
1=

Solving for

IT

±

k~O

e-A(nrr-k) (n)8 k (1 _ 8)n-k.

k

yields
1
i\

IT = -In(l

+ 8(e'\ -

1))

so that IT is independent of nand w. This property of exponential utility pricing, known as additivity, is desirable because the order in which
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Figure 2
Safety First Supply Function
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independent risks are taken do not affect the price of each risk. 3 This
property does not hold for logarithmic and quadratic utility functions.
We will show in the next section that for logarithmic and quadratic
utility functions, the premiums are practically constant, increasing very
slowly as n increases. Premiums will increase substantially with n under all of these utility functions, however, when there is ambiguity in
the probability distribution associated with lusses.

3 Ambiguity and Insurance Pricing
The literature on credibility theory provides the foundation for modeling the impact on premiums if there is ambiguity with respect to
the parameters of probability distributions; see, for example, Heilmann
3It is well-known that exponential utility yields premiums that are independent of
nand 1'1'; see Gerber (1979, Chapter 5).
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(1989) and Venter (1990) for more on credibility theory. Given the na-

ture of credibility theory, it has been long recognized that Bayesian
techniques can be utilized to replace the ad hoc formulae that actuaries have been using for pricing (Mayerson, 1964). Klugman (1992)
gives an excellent treatment of the application of Bayesian techniques
to credibility theory. Although research is being conducted on expected
utility premium principles (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987) and credibility
theory, little work has been done on expected utility pricing under parameter uncertainty.4
In the literature on ambiguity, uncertainty over the parameters of
probability distributions often is characterized as disagreement among
experts. s In such situations, however, we may be able to use mixing
distributions G for parameters in modeling such uncertainty. A uniform
distribution, for instance, may depict a situation in which opinion is
spread evenly over a range of values. A discrete mixing distribution,
on the other hand, could be used to represent a case where there are
substantial differences of opinion and the experts have specific values
for the parameters. We will see that under extreme ambiguity insurers often will be unwilling to provide coverage at any price when they
are following safety first principles. This will not be the case under
expected utility pricing.
It is useful to contrast the concept of ambiguity, as defined in this
paper, with that of process risk which often is used to characterize uncertainty. Ambiguity (also called parameter risk) refers to uncertainty in
the parameters of the probability or outcome distribution, whereas process risk refers to the risk associated with the projection of future losses
which are inherently random. 7 Actuaries often use mixtures of distributions to model situations where parameters vary over a population;
see Panjer and Willmot (1992, Chapters 2.8 and 8). We are, however,
applying mixtures in a different way. The distribution of the parameter
now is used to characterize parameter risk. This approach differs from
Bayesian analYSis as there is no updating procedure; rather, the focus
is the degree of uncertainty about the true value of the parameter.
With ambiguity, e is the uncertain parameter in the speCification of
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) X, Fe(x). In this case, e is
4But see Freifelder (1976, 1979). Goovaerts, De Vylder, and Haezendonck (1984)
study the effect of parameter uncertainty on premium principles such as the Escher,
but not utility theory.
sFor example, in asseSSing risks such as underground storage tank, earthquake, and
satellite, the scientific community is divided due to the lack of data and causal models.
6The mixing distribution is the probability distribution of the uncertain parameter.
7This definition of process risk follows McClenahan (1990, page 61).
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viewed as a random variable with cdf G(8). Throughout the rest of this
paper, the probability distribution function (pdf) (if e is continuous) or
probability function (if e is discrete) of e is denoted by 9(8) = dG(8).
The pricing equation for expected utility theory is

+ nIT - X)] Ie]

Ee[E[u(w

U(w)

f:=-oo J:=o u(w + nIT - x)dFo(x) dG(8).

(6)

Because the mean of e is assumed to be a known constant, ambiguity
will not influence pricing under risk neutrality.
To contrast the differences between the effect of ambiguity on expected utility and safety first pricing we consider the same case discussed above where the firm is assumed to be insuring identical independent Bernoulli risks. The premium per risk, IT, as a function of n is
computed under the following conditions:
• No ambiguity;
• The uniform mixing distribution,
(e) =

91

f
l

1 for 0 :s; e :s; 1
0 otherwise;

• The discrete mixing distribution,
, (8)
92

=

S 0.5

l

for e = 0 or 1
0 otherwise.

Note that both 91 (8) and 92(8) yield E[e = 0.5].
Under each of the above conditions, we will use the exponential utility function defined in equation (5) and the following utility functions:
Ul(X)
uq(x)

In(201 + x) logarithmic: with x> -201; and
-(10 - X)2 quadratic: with -00 < x :s; 10.

(7)
(8)

Using equation (6), the expressions for the premiums can easily be calculated.
Table 1 depicts the resulting premiums for these different utility
functions and mixing distributions. Although the premium for exponential utility remains constant with no ambiguity, the fact that prf'miums increase as n increases for all of the mixing distributions means
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that additivity does not hold under parameter uncertainty. The premiums for the logarithmic utility function for the no ambiguity and uniform mixing distribution cases are determined by numerical methods.
As is the case for the exponential utility function, the premium under
ambiguity increases with 11. and is higher for the discrete than for the
uniform mixing distribution. The same results hold for the quadratic
utility function. For the discrete mixing distribution, the premiums are
higher than under the uniform mixing distribution due to the concentration of mass at probability zero and one. One interpretation of such
behavior is a split in expert opinion: one group believes an event is certain to occur, while another group believes it will not. If the event does
occur, all risks will suffer losses. This kind of extreme ambiguity, such
as that given by a discrete mixing distribution, thus translates into a
perfect correlation of risks.
Table 1
Premiums for E[8 = 0.5]
Mixing Distributions
NAB
Utility
11.
91 (8)
92(8)
Exponential
0.6200
0.6200
1 0.6200
0.8060
10 0.6200
0.9310
20 0.6200
0.8710
0.9650
0.9580
0.9930
100 0.6200
Logarithmic

1
10
20
100

0.5006
0.5006
0.5006
0.5006

0.5006
0.5025
0.5046
0.5212

0.5006
0.5062
0.5124
0.5613

Quadratic

1
10
20
100

0.5125
0.5126
0.5127
0.5134

0.51251
0.5513
0.6021

0.5125
0.6340
1.0000

Note: NAB

=

No Ambiguity.

In general, probability uncertainty introduces correlation into portfolios that otherwise would consist of independent risks if the value
of 8 were known. The relation between ambiguity and correlation is

282

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994

particularly clear when both the risks and the parameters are normally
distributed. In this case, if the normal mixing distribution for 8 has
variance T2 then the correlation between the risks is also T2 (Heilmann,
1989, p. 81). Thus, parameter uncertainty translates directly into correlation between risks that are conditionally independent.
Premiums under ambiguity are calculated in Table 2 using exponential utility and the safety first stability constraint. In each case we use
three different mixing distributions:
93(8)

94(8)

95(8)

{
{

5 for 0::0; 8 ::0; 0.2
0 otherwise;
0.5 for 8 = 0 or 0.2
0 otherwise;
0.9 for 8 = 0
0.1 for 8 = 1
0 otherwise.

{

For each of these three mixing distributions E[8]

=

0.1.

Table 2
Premiums for Exponential Utility and Safety First
Mixing Distributions
NAB 93(8) 94(8) 95 (8)
n
Exponential
1 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159
10 0.159 0.188 0.231 0.770
20 0.159 0.211 0.261 0.885
100 0.159 0.263 0.288 0.977
Safety First
(with stability
constraint)
Note: NAB

=

1
10
20
100

1.000
0.300
0.200
0.150

1.000
0.300
0.250
0.210

1.000
0.400
0.300
0.250

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

No Ambiguity.

For the exponential utility function defined in equation (5) and no
ambiguity, the insurer's premium is independent of the number of risks
and is given by IT = 0.159. Probability ambiguity causes premiums to
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increase rapidly as 11 increases. For the discrete mixing distribution
95(8), the premium is as high as 0.977 when 11 = 100.
For the safety first model the story is completely different, as indicated in Table 2. The premiums required under the stability constraint
given by equation (2) decline as n increases. In the most extreme case,
the discrete mixing distribution over [0,1], the constraint never can be
met because the probability of n losses is 0.10 and we have assumed
that PI = 0.05 in equation (2).
Table 3 shows the impact of the survival constraint (given by equation (4) with pz = 0.00001) on premiums for relatively small values of
n for the non-ambiguous case and when the probability distribution of
losses is ambiguous using 93. Consider the non-ambiguous case. In
order to understand how the firm's surplus and number of poliCies n
affect TTl', let
k(n) = min{k: Pr[K > k] < pz}.
(9)
Then for f

=

1,

w
n
Thus the insurer's current surplus on hand, w, can be viewed as a meaTTl' =

k(n)

max{O, - - - -}.

n

sure of its capacity to accept risks and has its greatest impact for small
values of n. Insurers with larger capacity are able to charge lower premiums. Note that as n increases (starting from 1), premiums may increase or decrease depending on the behavior of k(n)/n. But, from the
law of large numbers, k(n)/n goes to £[8] as n goes to infinity. So
the premium TTl' eventually will approach the expected loss. (See Figure
1.) Like the stability constraint, the required premiums increase under
this mixing distribution compared to the non-ambiguous case, but the
premiums also decline as the number of risks increases.
Thus a distinction emerges between the predictions of safety first
and utility theory under ambiguity. With extreme ambiguity, coverage
will be denied under the safety first criteria, while under more moderate
conditions premiUms will increase but eventually will decline for large
11. On the other hand, in utility theory, increased ambiguity results in
higher premiums and the failure of the law of large numbers to have
any influence as the number of risks increases.

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.2, 1994

284

Table 3
Premiums (TTl')
Under Survival Constraint
No Ambiguity 93(0)
w
n
0.70
0
10
0.60
20
0.45
0.55
0.32
0.42
50
0.25
0.35
100
0.30
200
0.20
5

10
20
50
100
200

0.10
0.20
0.22
0.20
0.18

0.20
0.30
0.32
0.30
0.28

10

10
20
50
100
200

0.00
0.00
0.12
0.15
0.15

0.00
0.05
0.22
0.25
0.25

20

50
100
200

0.00
0.05
0.10

0.02
0.15
0.20
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Empirical Results

Hogarth and Kunreuther (1990) conducted a survey to test the various theories of insurance pricing. Actuaries were asked to price warranties on the performance of a component of a new line of microcomputers. They were told that the cost of repair is $100, and there can
be at most one breakdown per period. Experimental variations concern
the number of units insured, ambiguous and non-ambiguous probabilities of breakdown, and probability levels of 0.001, 0.01, and 0.10. In
the ambiguous versions of the scenario, respondents were told there
is considerable disagreement among experts regarding the probability
of a breakdown of any given unit, while in the non-ambiguous versions
they were told that the experts all agree on the chances of a breakdown.
The results are listed in Table 4 in terms of the ratios of the prices
proposed by the actuaries to the expected losses. It is evident in all
cases that ambiguity results in higher prices. What is difficult to explain, however, is that even in the absence of ambiguity, prices increase
as risks are added for e = 0.001 and e = 0.01 while they decline for
e = 0.10. Utility theory implies that premiums increase as risks are
added under decreasing absolute risk aversion, and premiums decline
under increasing absolute risk aversion (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987;
see note 5). The above empirical results seem to suggest that the actuaries' utility functions exhibit decreasing and increasing absolute risk
aversion over the appropriate ranges.
Table 4
Actuaries' Price-Expected Loss Ratios for Warranties
e = 0.001 e = 0.01
e = 0.100
n= 10,000
Non -ambiguous
1.266
1.149
1.075
Ambiguous
2.439
1.587
1.370

n=

100,000
Non-ambiguous
Ambiguous

1.538
3.333

1.176
1.961

1.020
1.316

Source: Hogarth, R. and Kunreuther, H. "Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance."
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1990): 5-35.
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It is possible, however, to explain the actuaries' pricing from the
perspective of safety first theory. We noted earlier that the premiums
implied by the survival constraint can rise for smaller values of n followed by declines. The observed patterns of pricing with no ambiguity
can be explained if premiums are increasing for 8 = 0.001 and 8 = 0.01
and decreasing for 8 = 0.10 over the range of n being considered.
Consider, for example, the results exhibited in Table 5 for w = 15.
For 8 = 0.001 prices peak at n = 40,000, while for 8 = 0.10 prices
decline over the entire range of values for n. When n increases from
10,000 to 100,000, prices thus increase for 8 = 0.001 and decline for
8 = 0.10. This occurs because the relative magnitude of the initial
surplus is higher for small values of 8. The capacity goes further for
smaller values of 8 and, therefore, the premiums rise for larger values
of n.

Table 5
Impact of Survival Constraint on Premiums
With w = 15 and Non-Ambiguous Risks
TT/8
TT
8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100
8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100
n
1.10
1.ll5
10,000
O.OOllO
0.lll5
1.35
1.084
20,000
0.00135
0.1084
0.1070
1.37
1.070
30,000
0.00137
40,000
0.00138
0.1061
1.38
1.061
50,000
0.1055
1.36
1.055
0.00136
60,000
0.1050
1.35
1.050
0.00135
1.33
1.046
70,000
0.00133
0.1046
0.1044
1.33
1.044
80,000
0.00133
1.31
90,000
0.00131
0.1041
1.041
1.30
1.039
0.00130
0.1039
100,000

The fact that for the survey of actuaries relative prices are higher
for smaller values of 8 is explained readily in the presence of expenses
that do not vary with the probability of loss.
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5 Coverage Limits
The consideration of ambiguity can shed light on another question
of interest. The fact that insurance companies offer liability policies
with specified coverage limits is a puzzle from the perspective of utility theory. Models of risk sharing under expected utility maximization
invariably conclude that the entire risk should be split according to the
risk preferences of the parties to the exchange. The optimal contractual
forms do not include coverage limits but involve deductibles and coinsurance above some level. Only in the case of a regulatory constraint
requiring insurers to sell a policy with a prescribed actuarial value has
it been shown that there will be policy limits (Raviv, 1979). Huberman,
Mayers, and Smith (1983) derive coverage limits when demand is influenced by limited liability under speCific assumptions about the nature
of the risk, but this does not explain insurers' reluctance to offer policies with unlimited exposure. In fact, consideration of limited liability
of insurers would suggest that they would be more than willing to sell
such poliCies if there were relatively low costs of bankruptcy.
The above analysis assumes a fixed loss size of one, but it easily is
extended to a severity of loss sizee. The survival constraint may be
written as
IV
(10)
Pr[K ~ 7 + nIT] ::s; 0.00001,
where IT is now the premium per dollar of coverage. Note that capacity
is now IV II! instead of IV. As I! increases, capacity approaches zero,
which limits the ability of firms to write small numbers of large risks.
In this case the supply function with IV = 0 in Figure 1 is an appropriate
representation of the insurer's ability to provide coverage.
Large values of I! together with ambiguity further will act to raise
prices and limit availability. From equations (10) and (9),

ken)
IV
IT-----,
- n

ne

(11)

so for large I! the ratio k(n)ln becomes the key determinant of price.
In the absence of ambiguity k (n) I n will approach 8 (recall that 8 is

known) as n gets large. This is generally not the case when ambiguity
is present. For example, when E[8] = 0.5
• Under the uniform mixing distribution, the probability of all outcomes is 1/(n + 1), i.e.,
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1

Pr[K = k] =

r
Jo

(n)ek(l_ e)l1-kde
k

Hence the limit of k(n)/n as n

~

00

=

_1_.

n+1

is 1;

• When the ambiguity is characterized by the discrete mixing distribution over the [0, 1] interval, the probability of n losses is e,
so unless nil :5 w + nf.IT the survival constraint always will be
violated for e > 0.00001. Therefore, the law of large numbers is
ineffective in cases such as these. Hence, only a relatively small
number of risks m?y be underwritten.
Contrast these observations with the case of no ambiguity and independent risks: for e = 0.1 the number of risks n need only be six for
the probability of n losses to be less than 0.00001.
The company has three alternatives in meeting the survival constraint under extreme ambiguity-it can reduce n, raise IT, or reduce f.
Solving the constraint ni!:5 w + nfIT for n, we get n:5 w/((l-IT)-e).
In general, the constraint on the number of risks will be

w
n

:5

(k(l1) _ IT)!:"
n

With ambiguity, k(n)/n will be close to one for small values of n, so
the same analysis goes through under these conditions. This means
that the capacity w relative to the severity f determines how many
risks can be underwritten. A natural way to increase the number of
risks that can be underwritten is to reduce f by way of coverage limits.
Capacity also is increased by increasing IT, but IT cannot get too close
to one, especially when expenses are considered. When the constraint
is reached, nf = w + nfIT and the capacity to assume new risks is
exhausted. In order to assume a new risk, the premium collected must
be increased 100 cents to the dollars in order to prevent violation of
the constraint; that is, IT must approach one and the insurance will not
be purchased.
We see that ambiguity and safety first results in a focus on the worst
possible outcome (nf) that a portfolio of risks may suffer. Empirical studies of managerial behavior in the face of uncertainty suggest
that managers do tend to focus on the severity of the worst possible
BSee Kunreuther (1989) for an interview with an actuary who uses this expression
to explain his reaction to extre-me ambiguity.
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outcomes, paying less attention to the probability of their occurrence
(March and Shapira, 1987, p. 1407). Not only does this describe managerial behavior, but such a focus is prescribed by the leading texts on
risk management (e.g., Williams and Heins, 1989; Vaughan, 1992). Risk
management procedures call for prioritizing risks according to their
potential severity followed by an estimation of the probability of their
occurrence. The ambiguity inherent in many organizational risks calls
for a managerial focus on potentially catastrophic risks regardless of
the probability of their occurrence.

6

Discussion

The safety first model of insurance pricing has been shown to provide significantly different predictions from those of expected utility
theory. While the utility functions (exponential, quadratic and logarithmic) examined here exhibit nondecreasing premiums as risks are added
to the portfolio, under a safety first model premiums may increase or
decline for small values of n according to the predominance of the survival or stability constraints. Under safety first, the value of IT declines
as the number of insured risks becomes relatively large.
When ambiguity is present, price increases are exaggerated under
utility theory, whereas for safety first the results depend on the extent
of the ambiguity. Under extreme ambiguity insurers often will be reluctant to provide coverage at any price except dollar-for-dollar, while
for more moderate ambiguity, premiums will be higher even though
they eventually may decline. Safety first theory also has been shown
to yield a definition of capacity as referring to the ability to underwrite
relatively small numbers of risks and to provide explanations for the existence of coverage limits in liability insurance. It appears that Stone's
characterization of insurer behavior has considerable merit.
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